- Daily payout (production): `./venv/bin/python distribute.py` — reads the current voters snapshot **restricted to the reward window** (not stale AND account mature, `last_vote > now−28d` AND `first_seen_at ≤ now−3d`, §V40/V52: new voters (`first_seen` recent/NULL) and stale voters get nothing — returning re-voters with mature first_seen are paid regardless of vote age), fetches the BP account's liquid VEX, splits it pro-rata by stake (floor 4-dec, dust stays in the account), and pushes one signed `vex.token::transfer` per voter with memo `DATABISNISID PROFIT SHARE YYYY-MM-DD`. Preview the plan without signing/writing: `./venv/bin/python distribute.py --dry-run`. Requires `VEX_BP_PRIVATE_KEY` (BP active key) in env/`.env`; without it `--dry-run` still works, a real run raises. A real run is a no-op (exit 0) unless `DISTRIBUTE_ENABLED=true` — default is off (kill-switch, V35); `--dry-run` always works. Failed rows are recorded `failed` and rejoined by the next day's run — no manual cleanup needed. **Send safety (V59)**: if a transfer broadcasts but Hyperion can't confirm it (`verify_txid` → None), the payment is held for real — marked `failed` at the first attempt and never re-signed (a resend would carry a fresh tapos/expiration → new txid → possible double-send); and chain rejections that come back as HTTP-500 bodies (pyntelope does NOT raise on them — duplicate/insufficient-balance, pattern V46/B11) are detected by `_send_rejected` and routed through the verify/retry path, never recorded `sent` for a tx that didn't land. **Node resilience (V58)**: all chain RPC calls fail over across the `API_NODES` pool (`VEX_API_NODES` CSV, default `v2.vexascan.com:2096` + `https://api.databisnis.id`) — balance fetch, ABI+TAPOS, and broadcast; the real-run balance fetch retries with backoff ~10 min before aborting to the next schedule, `--dry-run` fails fast.
- Daily payout (production): `./venv/bin/python distribute.py` — reads the current voters snapshot **restricted to the reward window** (not stale AND account mature, `last_vote > now−28d` AND `first_seen_at ≤ now−3d`, §V40/V52: new voters (`first_seen` recent/NULL) and stale voters get nothing — returning re-voters with mature first_seen are paid regardless of vote age), fetches the BP account's liquid VEX, splits it pro-rata by stake (floor 4-dec, dust stays in the account), and pushes one signed `vex.token::transfer` per voter with memo `DATABISNISID PROFIT SHARE YYYY-MM-DD`. Preview the plan without signing/writing: `./venv/bin/python distribute.py --dry-run`. Requires `VEX_BP_PRIVATE_KEY` (BP active key) in env/`.env`; without it `--dry-run` still works, a real run raises. A real run is a no-op (exit 0) unless `DISTRIBUTE_ENABLED=true` — default is off (kill-switch, V35); `--dry-run` always works. Failed rows are recorded `failed` and rejoined by the next day's run — no manual cleanup needed. **Send safety (V59)**: if a transfer broadcasts but Hyperion can't confirm it (`verify_txid` → None), the payment is held for real — marked `failed` at the first attempt and never re-signed (a resend would carry a fresh tapos/expiration → new txid → possible double-send); and chain rejections that come back as HTTP-500 bodies (pyntelope does NOT raise on them — duplicate/insufficient-balance, pattern V46/B11) are detected by `_send_rejected` and routed through the verify/retry path, never recorded `sent` for a tx that didn't land. **Node resilience (V58)**: all chain RPC calls fail over across the `API_NODES` pool (`VEX_API_NODES` CSV, default `v2.vexascan.com:2096` + `https://api.databisnis.id`) — balance fetch, ABI+TAPOS, and broadcast; the real-run balance fetch retries with backoff ~10 min before aborting to the next schedule, `--dry-run` fails fast.**Hyperion resilience (V60)**: every `/v2/*` read (`verify_txid`, `claim.reward_from_tx`, dashboard SALDO LIQUID) fails over across the `HYPERION_NODES` pool (`VEX_HYPERION_NODES` CSV, default = `HYPERION_API` + `API_NODES` dedup — both hosts verified to serve Hyperion) via `distribute._get_json` (GET mirror of the V58 `_post_json`, 3 rounds, 2s), so a single Hyperion blip no longer force-holds payments or fails reward measurement.
- Daily reward claim (production): `./venv/bin/python claim_loop.py` — the `claim` service scheduler. `claim.py` computes the claim window as `last_claim_time + 24h` (from the `vexcore``producers` table) in **UTC-naive time** (`_utcnow()`, matching the chain's UTC `last_claim_time`; the container's local TZ must not shift the window — V49/B13), sleeps until near it, then polls `vexcore::claimrewards` every `CLAIM_RETRY_SECONDS` (default 60) until the chain accepts; if 24h have already elapsed since the last claim the window clamps to now (missed-window recovery, no permanent spin-timeout). A claim is only treated as "landed" if Hyperion says `executed` OR `last_claim_time` actually advanced past its pre-send value (`_claim_time_advanced`) — on **both** the send-success and send-exception paths (`_confirm_landed`), because pyntelope's `send()` does NOT raise on a chain rejection (HTTP 500 comes back as a JSON body, V46/B11), and Hyperion returning `executed: false` for a just-landed-but-not-yet-indexed tx must NOT count as "didn't land" (V50/B14). Unconfirmed ⇒ silent `retry` (no `claim_runs` row, no success notify) — self-heals when Hyperion indexes the tx on the next poll. The landing baseline (`last_claim_time` before send) is captured **once per poll window** in `poll_claim` and passed to every `_try_claim_once` — it must NOT be re-read per attempt, or a landed-but-stale-first-read claim falls into a permanent retry loop (V54/B16); `_confirm_landed` also retries the post-send `last_claim_time` read so a lagging RPC node doesn't cause a false negative. The **pre-claim liquid balance** is likewise captured **once per poll window** (`before_balance`) and passed to every `_try_claim_once` (V56/B18) — if a claim lands on attempt 1, the next (rejected "already claimed") attempt must still measure the reward via the window-start balance, not a re-read `before` that already includes the credit (which reads delta 0 → false `KLAIM MENDARAT · REWARD TAK TERUKUR`, e.g. the 2026-08-10 claim `bfa9ab02…` reward 1679.3365 recorded against rejected tx `b0a8b2f9…`). `next_window` raises if all producer reads fail (never clamps to now prematurely). Reward is measured **from the claim tx itself** (sum of `vex.bpay`+`vex.vpay` → BP transfers via Hyperion, `reward_from_tx`), **retried up to 4× at `SETTLE_SECONDS` (30s)** so a just-landed tx not yet indexed by Hyperion doesn't read as `None` (V55/B17); if Hyperion is down it falls back to the liquid-balance delta, but **only a positive delta (`after > before`) counts as measured** — a 0 delta is ambiguous (stale node balance) and is treated as unmeasured, never as a genuine zero; if neither can be read the claim is recorded with fee `pending` and an internal `KLAIM MENDARAT · REWARD TAK TERUKUR` alert is sent (never a misleading 0-reward success — a real 0-reward claim must be evidenced by `reward_from_tx` returning `Decimal('0')` from an executed tx). 10% (`VEX_BP_FEE_PERCENT`) is transferred to `VEX_BP_FEE_WALLET` (default `bpdbsjasprod`) with memo `BP FEE YYYY-MM-DD`, reusing `distribute.build_signed_transfer`. A claim cycle is complete only when the claim is recorded in `claim_runs` AND the fee is sent; an unsent fee (`pending`/`failed`) is retried each cycle and resumed on restart (crash-safe). No mutex with `distribute.py` — distribution freezes the balance at run start, so a mid-run claim is deferred to the next run.
- Storage backend: `db.py` abstracts it. Default `sqlite` (`VEX_DB_PATH`, stdlib `sqlite3`, WAL). Optional `mysql` (`VEX_DB_BACKEND=mysql` + `VEX_DB_HOST/PORT/USER/PASS/NAME`, PyMySQL). Oracle tests stay on sqlite; `test_mariadb.py` is opt-in (skips unless `VEX_DB_BACKEND=mysql`). Query SQL is written once with `%s` placeholders (translated to `?` for sqlite); `db.query` always returns a list.
- Test MariaDB/MySQL via docker: `docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml up -d` (mariadb:11 container `databisnisid-mariadb`, localhost-only `127.0.0.1:3306`, db/user/pass `databisnisid`/`databisnis`/`databisnis`, named volume, healthcheck). Stop/remove with `docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml down`; wipe data with `docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml down -v`. Verify with `docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml exec mariadb mariadb -u databisnis -pdatabisnis databisnisid -e 'SELECT 1'`. Smoke against the container:
- Docker Swarm (production stack): images are registry-pushed `git.proit.id/proitlab/databisnisid-web` + `databisnisid-scan` + `databisnisid-dist` + `databisnisid-claim` — build & push them first (`docker build -t git.proit.id/proitlab/databisnisid-web . && docker push git.proit.id/proitlab/databisnisid-web`, same for the scan, dist and claim images), then from a swarm manager run `docker stack deploy -c docker-compose.yml databisnisid`. Stack = mariadb (internal) + web (gunicorn dashboard, published `:5001`; also receives `TZ` + `DISTRIBUTE_HOUR`/`DISTRIBUTE_WEEKDAY`/`DISTRIBUTE_FIRST_RUN` from `.env` for the BERITA banner, V38) + scan (`scan_loop.py`, runs `get_voters.py` at `SCAN_HOURS` default `0,8,16`, local timezone `TZ` default `Asia/Jakarta`, plus one scan at container start via `SCAN_RUN_ON_START`) + distribute (`distribute_loop.py`, runs `distribute.py` twice-weekly at `DISTRIBUTE_WEEKDAY` default `wed,sat` (CSV, multi-day V44) + hour `DISTRIBUTE_HOUR` default `10`, one-off `DISTRIBUTE_FIRST_RUN` default baked `2026-08-17`; schedule read via `config`, konsisten dgn dashboard); key `VEX_BP_PRIVATE_KEY` read from the bind-mounted `/app/.env` → host `/mnt/nfs/server5.saltis.id/data/databisnisid/app/config.env` via `config.py``load_dotenv`, `:ro`) + claim (`claim_loop.py`, poll `claimrewards` at the 24h window, key + Telegram also from the same NFS bind). `mariadb` is pinned by `placement.constraints: node.hostname == server5.saltis.id` because its data lives in the host bind mount `/data/db/mariadb/databisnisid/data` on that node; `web`/`scan`/`distribute`/`claim` exclude node `server2U` (`node.hostname != server2U`) but otherwise can run on any node and reach it over the overlay network `appnet`. Inspect: `docker stack services databisnisid`, `docker service logs databisnisid_scan`, `docker stack rm databisnisid`. `docker stack deploy` ignores `build:` (images must already be in the registry) and ignores `env_file` (env is inlined with `${VAR}` interpolation from `.env`). The local dev box has no swarm anymore (torn down) — if you re-init one there, the mariadb constraint leaves that task **Pending** since no node is named `server5.saltis.id`.
- Web dashboard (read-only, reads the store via `db.py`): production `./venv/bin/gunicorn -c gunicorn.conf.py dashboard:app` → http://127.0.0.1:5000/ (run from repo dir). Easier: `./run.sh` (same command, works from any cwd, `$@` passed through). `gunicorn.conf.py` imports `config` → `.env` honored; `DASH_WORKERS` (default 2) controls workers, `DASH_HOST`/`DASH_PORT` the bind. Dev server (single-process) still works via `./venv/bin/python dashboard.py`. Vote bands (V40/V42/V52): BARU (new first-time voters, `first_seen_at` within 3 days, own table on top, never paid — maturity is measured from `first_seen_at`, NOT `last_vote` which is week-quantized) → main list: KADALUARSA (28–31 days, pinned amber rows at the top with `VOTE ULANG` badge + legend) then VALID (the paged 50/page list, `staked DESC`, live owner search via `/api/search`); voters older than 31 days are stored by the scan but hidden. Since V42, **REVOTE** (returning voters, `voter_first_seen.first_seen_at ≤ now−3d`) are VALID immediately — they join the main list tagged with a mint `REVOTE` tag (legend `TAG MINT = REVOTE KURANG DARI 1 HARI · VALID LANGSUNG`), no separate band, no maturity wait; since V43 the mint tag shows only while `last_vote > now−VEX_REVOTE_TAG_DAYS` (default 1 day) — after that they're plain VALID (still paid); VALID rows within `VEX_WARN_DAYS` (default 3) of the KADALUARSA cutoff get an amber dashed `VOTE ULANG SEGERA` badge (legend `TAG AMBER = KADALUARSA DALAM 3 HARI · N PEMILIH`); only genuinely new voters pass the 3-day maturity in BARU. Data freshness comes from the daily scan run — the dashboard never scans.
- Tests (the verification oracles): `./venv/bin/python test_get_voters.py`, `./venv/bin/python test_dashboard.py`, `./venv/bin/python test_distribute.py`, `./venv/bin/python test_distribute_loop.py`, `./venv/bin/python test_images.py`, and `./venv/bin/python test_claim.py` must all exit 0. `test_images.py` (V31) is a static check that each image (`Dockerfile`/`Dockerfile.scan`/`Dockerfile.dist`/`Dockerfile.claim`) copies every intra-project module its copied modules import. `test_distribute_loop.py` (V37/V44) is pure calendar logic — weekly schedule boundary (multi-day CSV) + one-off first-run. They mock the network / use a temp DB — the live node is too flaky/slow for a full-scan test. Run after touching the relevant file.
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Two tools scan the Vexanium blockchain voters table for accounts whose only vote
- Distribution (spec §V19–V27): each run pays the whole liquid balance pro-rata by stored `staked`, shares floored at 4 decimals with dust left in the account, one transfer per voter. A txid that can't be confirmed (`GET {HYPERION_API}/v2/history/get_transaction?id=<txid>` returns no `executed`) is never re-sent the same run — that payment stays `failed` and rejoins the next run. No-op (exit 0, no writes) when the voters table is empty or balance < 0.0001. The dashboard's `/history` view renders `distribute_runs` + `distribute_payments` read-only.
- Claim (spec §V32–V34): the BP reward is claimed once per 24h window via `vexcore::claimrewards` (`owner` = BP). The `claim` service polls every `CLAIM_RETRY_SECONDS` only near the window (`last_claim_time` from the `vexcore``producers` table + 24h) — no all-day tx spam; a window already ≥24h past clamps to now so a missed claim is caught up, never spin-timeout (B8). `get_table_rows` responses are always `{"rows":[...]}` — parse `data.get('rows')`, never `data[0]` (B7, V39). Landed detection = Hyperion `executed` OR `last_claim_time` advanced past pre-send value, checked on BOTH the send-success and send-exception paths (`_confirm_landed`) because pyntelope's `send()` returns HTTP 500 as a body instead of raising on a chain rejection (V46, B11); Hyperion `executed: false` on a not-yet-indexed tx still falls back to the `last_claim_time` advance check (V50, B14). `next_window` raises if all producer reads fail so a flaky node never triggers a premature claim. Reward = sum of `vex.bpay`+`vex.vpay` → BP transfers read from the claim tx via Hyperion (`reward_from_tx`), balance-delta as fallback (V33); if neither can be read → fee `pending` + internal `KLAIM MENDARAT · REWARD TAK TERUKUR` alert, never a misleading 0-reward success (B10). 10% fee floored at 4-dec goes to `bpdbsjasprod` (`VEX_BP_FEE_WALLET`), memo `BP FEE YYYY-MM-DD`, txid verified via Hyperion before any resend. A cycle completes only when the claim row (`claim_runs`) is recorded AND the fee is `sent`; an unsent fee is retried each cycle and resumed on restart. No mutex with distribution — the daily payout freezes the balance at run start, so a claim landing mid-run is simply paid out the next run.
- Dashboard layout (spec §V28): desktop gives AKUN/STAKE/REWARD/VOTE equal width with AKUN left and the other three centered; tablet keeps the fixed STAKE column (RANK 56 / AKUN 1fr / STAKE 160px / REWARD 1fr / VOTE 1fr); `/history` uses a six-column run grid and a four-column payment grid (AKUN/JUMLAH/STATUS/TXID) that shows only the latest run with its date in the title, and links each TXID to `https://vexascan.com/transaction/{txid}` — no TANGGAL or MEMO column (memo is on-chain only, not stored); mobile turns history rows into labeled cards. HTML responses use `Cache-Control: no-store`; stylesheet URL is versioned with `?v=` for deploy cache-busting.
- Liquid balance (spec §V16): a 4th stat cell "SALDO LIQUID" shows the BP account's liquid VEX (`account.core_liquid_balance`) fetched from `GET {HYPERION_API}/v2/state/get_account?account=<BP>`. The dashboard fetches it live but caches per-worker in memory for `DASH_LIQUID_TTL` (default 60s); a failed fetch keeps the last value (or renders `—` if none ever succeeded) and the failure is also cooled-down so the API isn't hammered. The dashboard still never writes to the DB.
- Liquid balance (spec §V16): a 4th stat cell "SALDO LIQUID" shows the BP account's liquid VEX (`account.core_liquid_balance`) fetched from `GET {node}/v2/state/get_account?account=<BP>` across the `HYPERION_NODES` pool (V60 — host mati → cadangan, SALDO tetap live). The dashboard fetches it live but caches per-worker in memory for `DASH_LIQUID_TTL` (default 60s); a failed fetch keeps the last value (or renders `—` if none ever succeeded) and the failure is also cooled-down so the API isn't hammered. The dashboard still never writes to the DB.
## Layout
@@ -40,13 +40,13 @@ Two tools scan the Vexanium blockchain voters table for accounts whose only vote
-`get_voters.py` — production fetcher: scan → filter (stake-min + BP target, semua umur vote disimpan V40; hanya last_vote tak terverifikasi dibuang) → `db.replace_snapshot` (each run replaces the table = daily snapshot, with `scanned_at` + derived `last_vote`; never appends history) → `db.record_first_seen` (V41: catat kemunculan pertama tiap owner ke `voter_first_seen`, idempoten).
-`db.py` — storage abstraction (sqlite default | mysql via PyMySQL); `connect/query/queryone/replace_snapshot`; `%s` → `?` for sqlite; `query` returns list. Juga tabel distribusi: `distribute_runs` + `distribute_payments` (append-only) + helper `ensure_distribute_schema/record_run/record_payment/update_payment_status/update_run_status/list_runs/list_payments`. Juga tabel klaim: `claim_runs` + helper `ensure_claim_schema/record_claim/update_claim_fee/pending_claim_fee`. Juga tabel V41 `voter_first_seen` (owner PK + `first_seen_at`, append-only) + helper `ensure_first_seen_schema/record_first_seen` — dipakai dashboard membedakan PEMILIH BARU vs REVOTE. Juga helper V57 `eligible_voters(owner=None)` — single-source SQL jendela reward (payout window, V40/V52): `last_vote > now−STALE AND first_seen_at IS NOT NULL AND first_seen_at ≤ now−MATURITY` (cutoff UTC-naive); tanpa `owner` → semua baris `(owner, staked)` utk distribusi; dgn `owner` → baris akun itu (`[]`|one row) utk endpoint cek.
-`get_voters.js` — reference implementation only.
-`distribute.py` — pembayaran harian: fetch liquid balance → baca pemilih **band reward V40/V52** (`db.eligible_voters()` — V57 single source: `last_vote > now−28d AND first_seen_at ≤ now−3d`, pemilih baru (`first_seen` baru/NULL) & basi ⊥ dibayar; akun yang sudah matang dibayar langsung, ⊖ peduli umur vote, V52) → `compute_shares` (Decimal floor 4-des, sisa di akun) → sign `vex.token::transfer` via pyntelope (`trx.link` ambil ABI+TAPOS dari node, `sign` dengan `VEX_BP_PRIVATE_KEY`, `.send()`) → catat `sent/failed` per voter; verifikasi txid via Hyperion sebelum kirim ulang; `--dry-run` = rencana ⊥ tanda tangan; notifikasi Telegram mulai/selesai/gagal via `telegram.py` (best-effort, ⊥ dry-run/no-op). **V58 failover node pool**: `_post_json` coba SEMUA `API_NODES` per putaran (semua gagal → RuntimeError); `build_signed_transfer` coba tiap node utk link+sign (net ter-bind → send ikut node sama); `fetch_balance_with_retry` backoff `[30,60,90,120,150,180]s` (~10 mnt) di real-run sebelum menyerah ke jadwal berikutnya, dry-run satu attempt. **V59 send aman**: `verify_txid` → None (Hyperion down) = TAHAN sungguhan (break + `failed` di attempt 1, ⊖ resend dgn tapos baru yang bisa ganda); `_send_rejected(resp)` mendeteksi body HTTP-500 (pyntelope ⊥ raise, pola V46/B11 — duplicate/insufficient-balance) → raise → jalur verify/retry, ⊖ pernah `sent` untuk tx yang ⊥ mendarat. `test_distribute.py` — oracle (mock chain+pyntelope, temp DB).
-`claim.py` — klaim reward BP harian: baca `last_claim_time` (tabel `producers`, di-retry V46) → `next_window` = +24 jam, math UTC-naive via `_utcnow()` (V49/B13 — ⊥ `datetime.now()` lokal yang geser +TZ → poll prematur) → (≥24 jam lewat → clamp ke now, recovery B8); tidur sampai mendekat, lalu poll `vexcore::claimrewards` (sign pyntelope `VEX_BP_PRIVATE_KEY`) tiap `CLAIM_RETRY_SECONDS`; deteksi mendarat via `_confirm_landed` di KEDUA jalur (send sukses & exception) = Hyperion `executed` ATAU `last_claim_time` maju dari baseline (V46/B11 — `send()` pyntelope ⊥ raise saat chain menolak, HTTP 500 sbg body; Hyperion `executed: false` utk tx baru-mendarat-belum-terindeks juga dicek lewat `_claim_time_advanced`, V50/B14); tak terkonfirmasi → retry senyap; reward = isi tx via Hyperion (bpay+vpay → BP, `reward_from_tx`) prioritas — di-RETRY 4× dgn `SETTLE_SECONDS` (30) beri waktu Hyperion indeks tx baru (V55/B17); selisih saldo fallback HANYA delta positif (`after > before`), delta 0 ambigu → ⊥ dianggap reward 0; baseline saldo (`before_balance`) dibaca SEKALI per window & dibawa tiap attempt (V56/B18) — klaim mendarat attempt 1 lalu attempt 2 ditolak (already claimed) ⊖ boleh baca-ulang `before` yg sudah termasuk reward → delta 0 → alert palsu; reward ⊥ terukur → fee `pending` + notif `KLAIM MENDARAT · REWARD TAK TERUKUR` (V33/B10/V55/V56), ⊖ pernah `KLAIM REWARD SUKSES 0.0000` palsu; fee 10% (`VEX_BP_FEE_PERCENT`) floor 4-des → `VEX_BP_FEE_WALLET` via `distribute.build_signed_transfer`, memo `BP FEE YYYY-MM-DD`; parse `get_table_rows` pakai `data.get('rows')` (bentuk asli dict, ⊥ `data[0]` — B7/V39); `step()` = state machine (resume fee → jadwal → poll), source of truth `claim_runs` (fee pending/failed diulang + resume saat restart). Modul logika (⊥ CLI). `test_claim.py` — oracle (mock chain+pyntelope, bentuk respons asli, temp DB).
-`distribute.py` — pembayaran harian: fetch liquid balance → baca pemilih **band reward V40/V52** (`db.eligible_voters()` — V57 single source: `last_vote > now−28d AND first_seen_at ≤ now−3d`, pemilih baru (`first_seen` baru/NULL) & basi ⊥ dibayar; akun yang sudah matang dibayar langsung, ⊖ peduli umur vote, V52) → `compute_shares` (Decimal floor 4-des, sisa di akun) → sign `vex.token::transfer` via pyntelope (`trx.link` ambil ABI+TAPOS dari node, `sign` dengan `VEX_BP_PRIVATE_KEY`, `.send()`) → catat `sent/failed` per voter; verifikasi txid via Hyperion sebelum kirim ulang; `--dry-run` = rencana ⊥ tanda tangan; notifikasi Telegram mulai/selesai/gagal via `telegram.py` (best-effort, ⊥ dry-run/no-op). **V58 failover node pool**: `_post_json` coba SEMUA `API_NODES` per putaran (semua gagal → RuntimeError); `build_signed_transfer` coba tiap node utk link+sign (net ter-bind → send ikut node sama); `fetch_balance_with_retry` backoff `[30,60,90,120,150,180]s` (~10 mnt) di real-run sebelum menyerah ke jadwal berikutnya, dry-run satu attempt. **V59 send aman**: `verify_txid` → None (Hyperion down) = TAHAN sungguhan (break + `failed` di attempt 1, ⊖ resend dgn tapos baru yang bisa ganda); `_send_rejected(resp)` mendeteksi body HTTP-500 (pyntelope ⊥ raise, pola V46/B11 — duplicate/insufficient-balance) → raise → jalur verify/retry, ⊖ pernah `sent` untuk tx yang ⊥ mendarat.**V60 Hyperion failover**: `_get_json` (GET mirror `_post_json`, 3 putaran, 2s, coba semua `HYPERION_NODES` per putaran → semua gagal → None) dipakai `verify_txid` — None kini berarti SEMUA host Hyperion gagal, jadi hold V59 jarang palsu.`test_distribute.py` — oracle (mock chain+pyntelope, temp DB).
-`claim.py` — klaim reward BP harian: baca `last_claim_time` (tabel `producers`, di-retry V46) → `next_window` = +24 jam, math UTC-naive via `_utcnow()` (V49/B13 — ⊥ `datetime.now()` lokal yang geser +TZ → poll prematur) → (≥24 jam lewat → clamp ke now, recovery B8); tidur sampai mendekat, lalu poll `vexcore::claimrewards` (sign pyntelope `VEX_BP_PRIVATE_KEY`) tiap `CLAIM_RETRY_SECONDS`; deteksi mendarat via `_confirm_landed` di KEDUA jalur (send sukses & exception) = Hyperion `executed` ATAU `last_claim_time` maju dari baseline (V46/B11 — `send()` pyntelope ⊥ raise saat chain menolak, HTTP 500 sbg body; Hyperion `executed: false` utk tx baru-mendarat-belum-terindeks juga dicek lewat `_claim_time_advanced`, V50/B14); tak terkonfirmasi → retry senyap; reward = isi tx via Hyperion (bpay+vpay → BP, `reward_from_tx` via `dist._get_json` pool `HYPERION_NODES`, V60) prioritas — di-RETRY 4× dgn `SETTLE_SECONDS` (30) beri waktu Hyperion indeks tx baru (V55/B17); selisih saldo fallback HANYA delta positif (`after > before`), delta 0 ambigu → ⊥ dianggap reward 0; baseline saldo (`before_balance`) dibaca SEKALI per window & dibawa tiap attempt (V56/B18) — klaim mendarat attempt 1 lalu attempt 2 ditolak (already claimed) ⊖ boleh baca-ulang `before` yg sudah termasuk reward → delta 0 → alert palsu; reward ⊥ terukur → fee `pending` + notif `KLAIM MENDARAT · REWARD TAK TERUKUR` (V33/B10/V55/V56), ⊖ pernah `KLAIM REWARD SUKSES 0.0000` palsu; fee 10% (`VEX_BP_FEE_PERCENT`) floor 4-des → `VEX_BP_FEE_WALLET` via `distribute.build_signed_transfer`, memo `BP FEE YYYY-MM-DD`; parse `get_table_rows` pakai `data.get('rows')` (bentuk asli dict, ⊥ `data[0]` — B7/V39); `step()` = state machine (resume fee → jadwal → poll), source of truth `claim_runs` (fee pending/failed diulang + resume saat restart). Modul logika (⊥ CLI). `test_claim.py` — oracle (mock chain+pyntelope, bentuk respons asli, temp DB).
-`claim_loop.py` — scheduler harian dalam container stack (service `claim`): `_wait_db` (duplikat scan_loop) lalu `claim.step()` terus, loop tak pernah keluar.
-`telegram.py` — kirim notifikasi status distribusi + klaim via Telegram Bot API (best-effort; ⊥ token/chat id → kanal no-op senyap; gagal kirim → log saja). Dua kanal: `TELEGRAM_COMMUNITY_CHAT_IDS` (CSV) = brief mulai/selesai distribusi saja; `TELEGRAM_INTERNAL_CHAT_IDS` (CSV) = detail distribusi + semua kegagalan + klaim reward (⊥ komunitas, V30/V36). `send_text(text, chat_ids=None)` = komunitas, `send_internal(text)` = internal; dari env/`.env`/NFS `config.env`.
-`dashboard.py` + `templates/index.html` + `templates/history.html` + `static/style.css` + `static/app.js` — Flask web dashboard; reads the store via `db.py`, styled per `DESIGN.md`; `app.js` = debounced live owner search (fetch `/api/search`), degrades to the server-side `?q=` GET form if JS is off. Three vote-age bands (V40/V52): the voters list is split into BARU (top, `PEMILIH BARU · BELUM MATANG`, new accounts by `first_seen_at` within 3 days) and the main list (`voter-list` section, `.reward` cells, V29) where KADALUARSA rows are pinned at the top with amber styling + `VOTE ULANG` badge + legend before the paged VALID rows, which LEFT-joins a `status='sent'` payments aggregate for the TOTAL REWARD column; since V42 the VALID list also holds REVOTE (returning re-voters, `voter_first_seen.first_seen_at ≤ now−3d`) tagged with a mint `REVOTE` tag (legend `TAG MINT = REVOTE KURANG DARI 1 HARI · VALID LANGSUNG`, shows only while `last_vote > now−VEX_REVOTE_TAG_DAYS`) — no separate band, no maturity wait; only genuinely new voters sit in BARU tagged `BARU`; since V43 VALID rows within `VEX_WARN_DAYS` of the KADALUARSA cutoff get an amber dashed `VOTE ULANG SEGERA` badge + legend `TAG AMBER = KADALUARSA DALAM 3 HARI · N PEMILIH` (display-only); search (`?q=` and `/api/search`) covers all bands and tags each result (`group` = `baru|revote|valid|kadaluarsa` + `expired` + `expiring`); `/api/voter/<owner>` (V57) returns `{"owner", "is_valid_voter"}` — payout-eligibility check via the SAME `db.eligible_voters(owner)` window distribute pays from (never a second SQL copy), DB-snapshot only, always 200; Banner BERITA (V38) shows the next distribution run from `DISTRIBUTE_HOUR`/`DISTRIBUTE_WEEKDAY`/`DISTRIBUTE_FIRST_RUN` + `TZ` (mirror of `distribute_loop.next_boundary`, ⊥ impor lintas-image; drift guarded in test_dashboard); the `SETIAP ... · HH:00` recurrence line renders only for regular weekly rounds — hidden while the next event is the one-off first-run (`_is_first_run_next`, date ≠ weekly day). A `stats-note` caption states the list is single-vote-to-BP accounts ≥ min stake (V47); account names link to `https://vexascan.com/account/{owner}` in the index list, `/history` pay-list, and live search (`.owner-link`, V51); a promo card (`BY DATABISNISID · VEXWALLET`) links the VexWallet Android app on the index page via the IDRS logo (`static/idrs.png`) + `UNDUH DI PLAY STORE` (V53); BARU rows show a `MATURITY PERIOD` countdown column (`VALID DALAM N HARI`) instead of TOTAL REWARD. `/history` = riwayat distribusi read-only; `run-list` = six-column desktop/tablet grid, `pay-list` = four-column grid (AKUN/JUMLAH/STATUS/TXID) showing only the latest run with its date in the title, and labeled mobile cards.
-`gunicorn.conf.py` — gunicorn production config (bind/workers from `config`, sync worker). `run.sh` — launcher: `./run.sh` = `./venv/bin/gunicorn -c gunicorn.conf.py dashboard:app` from any cwd.
-`scan_loop.py` — scheduler dalam container stack: menunggu batas `SCAN_HOURS` (lokal via `TZ`), panggil `get_voters.main()`; skan-awal `SCAN_RUN_ON_START` + tunggu DB siap; loop tak pernah keluar.
-`distribute_loop.py` — scheduler dua-kali-minggu dalam container stack (service `distribute`): tunggu `DISTRIBUTE_WEEKDAY` (default `wed,sat`, CSV multi-hari V44) + `DISTRIBUTE_HOUR` (lokal via `TZ`), plus satu one-off `DISTRIBUTE_FIRST_RUN` (`YYYY-MM-DD`, default baked `2026-08-17`); jadwal dibaca via `config` (konsisten dgn dashboard V38); panggil `distribute.main()`, loop tak pernah keluar; gagal dicatat dan dicoba di jadwal berikutnya; ⊥ distribusi-awal saat start (snapshot bisa basi).
-`Dockerfile` — image web `databisnisid-web` (gunicorn dashboard; `DASH_HOST=0.0.0.0` di stack agar ingress menjangkaunya). `Dockerfile.scan` — image `databisnisid-scan` (scan_loop; sertakan `tzdata`). `Dockerfile.dist` — image `databisnisid-dist` (distribute_loop; sertakan `tzdata` + pyntelope via requirements). `Dockerfile.claim` — image `databisnisid-claim` (claim_loop + claim + distribute untuk fee; sertakan `tzdata` + pyntelope). Di stack produksi keempatnya di-push ke registry `git.proit.id/proitlab/databisnisid-{web,scan,dist,claim}` (⊥ `build:` di compose). `.dockerignore` — venv/.env/artifak tak masuk build context.
web: GET `/api/search?q=` → JSON `{query,count,cap,results:[{owner,staked,weight,rank,last_vote,total_reward}]}`, rank global, cap 500
web: GET `/api/voter/<owner>` → JSON `200 {owner, is_valid_voter}` (payout-eligible check, V57); selalu 200, ⊖ 404; DB-snapshot saja, ⊖ format-validation
env: `VEX_TARGET_BP`, `VEX_API_NODE`, `VEX_API_NODES` (CSV pool RPC failover distribusi, V58), `VEX_DB_PATH`, `VEX_DB_BACKEND`, `VEX_DB_HOST`, `VEX_DB_PORT`, `VEX_DB_USER`, `VEX_DB_PASS`, `VEX_DB_NAME`, `VEX_MIN_STAKED_VEX`, `DASH_PAGE_SIZE`, `DASH_HOST`, `DASH_PORT`, `DASH_WORKERS`, `VEX_STALE_DAYS`, `HYPERION_API`, `DASH_LIQUID_TTL`, `SCAN_HOURS`, `SCAN_RUN_ON_START`, `TZ`, `DISTRIBUTE_HOUR`, `DISTRIBUTE_WEEKDAY`, `DISTRIBUTE_FIRST_RUN` (dashboard banner V38; web service di stack menerima TZ + jadwal) — via `config.py` (`.env`)
env: `VEX_TARGET_BP`, `VEX_API_NODE`, `VEX_API_NODES` (CSV pool RPC failover distribusi, V58), `VEX_HYPERION_NODES` (CSV pool Hyperion failover V60, default `HYPERION_API` + `API_NODES` dedup), `VEX_DB_PATH`, `VEX_DB_BACKEND`, `VEX_DB_HOST`, `VEX_DB_PORT`, `VEX_DB_USER`, `VEX_DB_PASS`, `VEX_DB_NAME`, `VEX_MIN_STAKED_VEX`, `DASH_PAGE_SIZE`, `DASH_HOST`, `DASH_PORT`, `DASH_WORKERS`, `VEX_STALE_DAYS`, `HYPERION_API` (nama lama `DATABISNIS_API` masih dibaca, backward-compat), `DASH_LIQUID_TTL`, `SCAN_HOURS`, `SCAN_RUN_ON_START`, `TZ`, `DISTRIBUTE_HOUR`, `DISTRIBUTE_WEEKDAY`, `DISTRIBUTE_FIRST_RUN` (dashboard banner V38; web service di stack menerima TZ + jadwal) — via `config.py` (`.env`)
api: POST `https://v2.vexascan.com:2096/v1/chain/get_currency_balance` → body {code:`vex.token`, account, symbol:`VEX`} → `["X.XXXX VEX"]`
api: POST `https://v2.vexascan.com:2096/v1/chain/get_currency_stats` → {supply, max_supply, issuer} (cek precision)
api: POST `https://v2.vexascan.com:2096/v1/chain/push_transaction` (signed via pyntelope) → txid
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ V55: reward klaim TAK PERNAH tercatat/notif sbg `0.0000` sukses bila tak terukur
V56: baseline SALDO klaim STABIL per window (B18): `poll_claim` baca `before_balance` (saldo liquid) SEKALI di awal window & oper ke SETIAP `_try_claim_once(last_before, before_balance)` — ⊖ baca ulang per attempt: klaim yang mendarat di attempt 1 membuat `before` attempt 2 (ditolak already-claimed) SUDAH termasuk reward → delta 0 → reward tak terukur → alert palsu (kasus 10 Agt: tx `bfa9ab02` mendarat 15:46:18 reward 1679.3365, app ukur tx ditolak `b0a8b2f9` + before post-credit → alert `KLAIM MENDARAT · REWARD TAK TERUKUR`). Baseline stabil → delta fallback mengukur reward benar walau tx tercatat = attempt ditolak. Bila None (pemanggil langsung) → baca sendiri sbg fallback. Oracle test_claim: B18 attempt-1-mendarat (confirm basi) → retry, attempt-2-ditolak (last maju) → landed + reward 1679.3365/fee 167.9336 terukur, ⊖ alert | V56,V54,V55
V57: endpoint `GET /api/voter/<owner>` (web) → `200 {owner, is_valid_voter}` — `is_valid_voter` = akun memenuhi SYARAT REWARD saat ini (jendela payout distribusi V40/V52), BUKAN sekadar ada di tabel `voters` (BARU/KADALUARSA/tersembunyi/akun tak dikenal → `false`). Single source kebenaran: `db.eligible_voters(owner=None)` (db.py) memakai SQL jendela payout yg SAMA — `last_vote > now−STALE AND first_seen_at IS NOT NULL AND first_seen_at ≤ now−MATURITY` (cutoff UTC-naive) — dipakai BAIK `distribute.py:run_distribution` (tanpa owner → semua baris `(owner,staked)`) MAUPUN endpoint (dengan owner → `[]`|one row) → ⊖ duplikasi SQL (drift, gaya V38); endpoint: `is_valid_voter = len(db.eligible_voters(owner)) > 0`; DB-snapshot only (kesegaran = skan harian, V10), selalu 200, ⊖ format-validation nama akun. Oracle test_dashboard (V57): true utk acct###/revoter1/expire1; false utk newacct1 (BARU)/zzzold (kadaluarsa)/zzhide (tersembunyi)/asing; drift-guard endpoint==db + pool distribusi==db
V58: hardening distribusi vs node RPC mati: `config` += `API_NODES` (CSV `VEX_API_NODES`, default = `VEX_API_NODE` + `https://api.databisnis.id` — node mainnet terverifikasi, host sama dgn HYPERION_API tapi melayani juga `/v1/chain`). `distribute.py`: (1) `_post_json` mencoba SEMUA node per putaran (`max_retries` putaran penuh, jeda 2s antar putaran) → semua gagal → `RuntimeError` (bukan None); (2) `build_signed_transfer` coba tiap node utk `link()`+`sign()` (net di-bind ke node itu → broadcast `send()` ikut node sama) → semua gagal → raise; (3) `fetch_balance_with_retry(dry_run)` — real-run retry backoff `BALANCE_RETRY_DELAYS=[30,60,90,120,150,180]s` (~10.5 mnt) sebelum menyerah ke jadwal berikutnya; dry-run SATU attempt (gagal cepat, preview ⊥ tertahan). Net-effect: satu node mati → payout tetap jalan via cadangan; SEMUA node mati di real-run → jendela retry 10 mnt (bukan langsung abort) → lalu notify_failure + jadwal berikutnya; failed payments tetap rejoin run berikutnya (V22). Scan/claim ⊥ berubah (tetap `API_NODE` tunggal; fee klaim via `dist.build_signed_transfer` mewarisi failover gratis). Oracle test_distribute: V58 failover saldo (node mati → cadangan), semua-node-mati → raise, backoff retry-sampai-sukses + dry-run-satu-attempt, build_signed_transfer coba kedua node (mock pyntelope Net) | V58,V20,V22,V26
V60: failover pool Hyperion utk SEMUA pembacaan `/v2/*`: `config` += `HYPERION_NODES` (CSV `VEX_HYPERION_NODES`, default = `HYPERION_API` + `API_NODES` dedup, utama di depan — kedua host mainnet terverifikasi layani `/v2`, probe 2026-08-13). `distribute._get_json(url, params, max_retries=3, timeout=10)` — GET mirror `_post_json` V58: coba SETIAP node per putaran, `max_retries` putaran penuh, jeda 2s; SEMUA gagal → None (⊥ raise — pemanggil butuh None utk jalur tak-terukur/hold). `verify_txid` pakai `_get_json` → None kini berarti SEMUA host gagal SEMUA putaran (bukan satu host hiccup) → hold V59 jarang palsu. `claim.reward_from_tx` pakai `dist._get_json` (tiap attempt settle V55 jadi pool-robust). `dashboard._get_liquid_vex` loop `HYPERION_NODES` sendiri (web ⊥ impor distribute, V31) — host mati → cadangan, SALDO LIQUID tetap live. Net-effect: blip Hyperion sesaat ⊖ lagi menahan payout / ⊖ gagal ukur reward / ⊖ kosongkan saldo dashboard. Oracle: test_distribute V60 verify_txid failover (host mati → cadangan `executed`; semua mati → None), test_claim V60 reward_from_tx failover, test_dashboard V60 saldo dari cadangan + config default HYPERION_NODES | V60,V22,V45,V16
V59: kirim per-pemilih ⊖ pernah menyesatkan: (1) TAHAN yang sungguhan saat `verify_txid` → None (Hyperion tak terjangkau): break + tandai `failed` di ATTEMPT PERTAMA (bukan hanya di attempt terakhir — B19: kode lama print `ditahan` tapi lanjut retry → re-sign dgn tapos/expiration baru → txid BARU → re-broadcast berpotensi ganda walau tx pertama mendarat; oracle lama lolos karena set `DISTRIBUTE_MAX_ATTEMPTS=1`); (2) deteksi penolakan chain dari body HTTP-500: pyntelope `send()` ⊥ raise pada 500 (pola V46/B11), respons `{"code":500,"error":...}` datang sbg dict — `_send_rejected(resp)` mengenali bentuk error → raise RuntimeError → jalur verify/retry, ⊖ tandai `sent` utk tx yang ⊥ pernah mendarat (B19 juga: tanpa deteksi, penolakan duplicate/insufficient-balance dicatat `sent` dan ⊥ pernah dikejar). Oracle test_distribute: V59 hold-atau-retry di attempt 1 (3 attempt default, build dipanggil sekali per pemilih), V59 rejection-500 → `failed` + partial (⊖ `sent`) | V59,V22,V21
V35: kill-switch distribusi `DISTRIBUTE_ENABLED` default false → run nyata (bukan dry-run) no-op: exit 0, ⊥ baca saldo, ⊥ tanda tangan, ⊥ tulis DB, ⊥ notif; `--dry-run` tetap menampilkan rencana (read-only); nilai `true`/`1`/`yes` → normal
V36: notifikasi klaim reward (sukses `notify_claim` & gagal `notify_claim_failure`) → kanal INTERNAL saja, ⊥ pernah ke KOMUNITAS (V30); fee gagal ⊥ spam — satu notif per klaim (saat transisi ke `failed`)
check('V60 verify_txid failover → executed dari host cadangan',
dist.verify_txid('tx1')isTrue)
dist.HYPERION_NODES=['http://hyperion-dead']
check('V60 semua host Hyperion mati → None (bukan False)',
dist.verify_txid('tx1')isNone)
dist.HYPERION_NODES=_orig_hynodes
dist.requests.get=_orig_get# restore (set di awal suite)
dist.time.sleep=_orig_sleep
# ————— V20: compute_shares — floor 4 desimal, sisa tetap di akun —————
shares=dist.compute_shares(Decimal('100.0000'),
[('a',300.0),('b',700.0)])
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